It's funny, every time I read about yet another security vulnerability in Internet Explorer, such as the recent one involving Adobe Flash hosted on the Council of Foreign Relations website that performs a heap spray against Internet Explorer 8, I am reminded of the old Ralph Nader tome Unsafe at Any Speed, which was a book released in 1965 about how unsafe the automobiles designed by the American Auto Industry are. Thus, the phrase "Unsafe at Any Version" seems to come to mind when I think of Internet Explorer. Likewise, I tend to think the same thing about Adobe Acrobat, Adobe Flash, or Adobe Shockwave (2 year old vulnerability, anyone?)

Is it fair to say these products are unsafe at any version? While evidence seems to suggest that is probably true, I believe the security problems we see in these products are evidence of their success. Okay, maybe Internet Explorer was successful because of being illegally tied to Microsoft Windows, but I'm trying to remember the last time Internet Explorer, Adobe Flash, and Adobe Acrobat Reader were not considered "required items" for a PC.

Which is part of the problem of keeping these programs secure. There is a lot of legacy code in those apps. They were written well before Secure Coding Practices became the norm. Internet Explorer itself has a fundamental flaw by being so tightly tied into the operating system. Rewriting code is no fun and, unless there is a significant business reason to do so, doesn't happen.

Granted, Adobe did do this with Adobe Reader, but there's still a lot older Adobe Readers out there still, just waiting to be compromised. Just like there are millions of people still running XP and Internet Explorer 8, which Microsoft will eventually stop providing security patches for.

These applications aren't going anywhere anytime soon. Which means the bad guys are going to continue to find vulnerabilities in these applications for the foreseeable future. It certainly will keep us good guys busy for the foreseeable future, too.

Trust. It's something I'm sure many security professionals think about in various contexts. However, I don't think anyone can fully appreciate the level of trust that we exercise on a daily basis without really thinking about it.

Just think about getting packets from point A to point B. There's an insane amount of things we simply trust without really thinking about it. This includes:

  1. The program running on point A to generate traffic: who created that program? Will that program do something you don't expect?
  2. The OS running on point A: is that program running through an OS where key calls are "compromised" in the same way that the recent Linux Rootkit was?
  3. The various processors that run on point A: are those processors calculating true? Will they have a divide-by-zero bug like ye olde Pentium processors? Or did someone replace the processors in your device with one that purposefully does what you don't expect?
  4. The transmission medium of those packets: how secure is that medium? Who (or what) can read those packets off the wire, or the air as appropriate?
  5. The routers and switches along the way between point A and point B. They, too, are computers running code, are they not? Are they configured correctly? Will they route the packets along the path you expect? Are they potentially compromised as a result of bad design or malicious intent?
  6. Point B, that receives the traffic: does it believe what it is reading off the wire? How does it know Point A sent it? Will Point B process it correctly?

And so on. Trying to account for all these possibilities to ensure absolute security is next to impossible and will surely drive you crazy. That said, the thought exercise is important if you're trying to design a secure system. All of your assumptions about various elements of that system must be examined on a regular basis to ensure that you don't miss when something transitions from a largely theoretical threat to a very real one.

Soon, I'll share some ideas on what a "trust no one" network might look like. Does such a thing exist today? Is maintaining such a thing even practical?

If you've been in the IT industry long enough, you'll start seeing the same concepts "reinvented" every few years or so.

The current panacea is so-called Bring Your Own Device--the idea that an end user can use their own technology devices in a corporate setting while having some level of access to corporate data. While we went through this with laptops and personal computers over the years, now the devices we are bring our own of? Mobile phones/tablets.

Another acronym I've heard recently describes the state of IT, again, as long as I've been in it--Corporate Owned, Personally Enabled. Here, the idea is that a corporate-owned asset is used for an employee's personal needs. This has been the case with corporate-owned PCs forever without any formal policy for the last couple of decades. Now we're starting to see this with mobile devices, either with or without the use of third party tools.

The reality is that, regardless of whether companies adopt BYOD, COPE, something else, or neither, the reality is, employees are going to use personal devices to do work. And, likewise, use corporate devices for "personal use." This has always been the case and will always be the case, regardless of any formal policies to the contrary.

From a security point of view, this creates some rather obvious issues. On corporate-owned devices, some sort of "device management" or "Endpoint Security" offering is installed, which users tolerate to varying degrees. (I happen to like Check Point's Endpoint Security offering, but I will admit, I'm biased.) BYOD won't work because users are often asked to submit "device management" or an "Endpoint Security" installation in order to use their own device on the corporate network.

But ask yourself: what is it that you're really trying to protect on that endpoint? Prevent malicious software? You have a properly segmented network, right? You have the technology to detect any malicious traffic from that segment, right? Good. That should take care of it.

But what if the software doesn't "phone home" while on the corporate network (or generate malicious traffic), but collects data and then sends it out over the mobile operator's network? Modern mobile operating systems have these things called sandboxes that prevent one app from reading data from another in the first place. Obviously, if you're jailbroken or rooted, all bets are off.

And malicious apps, while not unheard of, are nearly non-existent in the official App Stores for iOS or Android. Same with potential privilege escalation-type attacks in iOS and Android. Not impossible but a lot harder to pull off, given that Android and (moreso) iOS are pretty secure out-of-the-box.

Really there's only one thing to worry about on these devices: the corporate data. This data needs to be protected. Which is generally pretty easy to do assuming only a trusted application is able to access the data, the regular OS protections are in place (i.e. device isn't rooted or jailbroken). And, of course, the data has to come on and off the device in a secure manner (e.g. either with strong encryption or using a physical access mechanism).

Once you have the magic, trusted app (or suite of apps) to access, work with, and secure the small amounts of corporate data the device can work with, congratulations! You've now eliminated the headache of managing potentially unknown devices in the hands of users who will do everything they can to thwart your security controls anyway. If users want to work with corporate data, they can use the "trusted" apps to do it, which should have appropriate hooks back to corporate to validate whether you are able to even use the data and, if you or your device goes rogue, wipe the data from your device without wiping the entire device (which has personal data on it).

While I believe there are great solutions along these lines (yet), this is the only kind of solution I believe makes any sense in the long term. People will be able to bring their own devices and access business data while infosec will rest easy knowing business data is still  accessed and stored safely.

It's a BYOD solution everyone can COPE with.

The implementation details will vary depending on the attack target and the request type, but the basic concept of a denial of service is to overwhelm a target with a seemingly legitimate series of requests so that real requests are ignored and not processed. If the attack is launched from multiple points on the network, it is referred to as a distributed denial of service attack (a.k.a. DDoS).

I remember when I first started hearing about denial of service issues more than 10 years ago. I even played with a few tools to generate them on my own--in my own network, of course. Back then, defenses for this sort of thing simply didn't exist. Aiming a tool at a helpless server protected by an even more helpless firewall was a great way to wreak havoc.

In general, there are two ways to create a Denial of Service condition:

  • Cause the relevant service to crash. This is actually pretty difficult to do in a simple fashion given the resiliency of most public-facing services, though for lesser-used services, it can happen.
  • Resource exhaustion, where some resource needed to provide the service (bandwidth, buffers, etc) is depleted in a way that causes the service to not respond to legitimate requests.

Over the years, every part of the service stack has gotten more resilient against the most basic form of these attacks. For example, a simple SYN flood won't take down most web servers these days as web servers are smart enough not to allocate resources to a connection until the three-way handshake completes. That said, if you can get a few million of your closest friends to run Low Orbit Ion Cannon at a server, or visit a particular webpage, you can still take down a target.

To give you a real-world example of this, I'll talk briefly about a recent denial of service someone brought to Check Point's attention via a Pastebin posting. The attack, ironically, was not all that different from the first SYN floods I played with more than a decade ago.

According to the report on Pastebin, the security researcher was able to essentially cause a Check Point Security Gateway to stop processing packets by sending ~120k packets per second. That's easy to generate inside a VMware environment, or even on an isolated network segment. Over an Internet link? Depends on the size of the pipe.

Regardless of how realistic that particular incoming packet rate may be in a given environment, what happens when the gateway sees that much traffic? In many cases, it simply runs out of memory, causing traffic to be dropped. It also runs out of processor capacity to forward said traffic.

Since the only way to truly stop a denial of service attack is to disconnect from the Internet, your best hope is that the various components are optimally configured to operate in potential denial of service conditions. Check Point's official response to this issue mentions four specific configuration changes that can be made to their security gateways:

  1. Implementing the IPS protection "SYN Attack" feature in SYN cookie mode, which will reduce the memory footprint caused by these bogus connection attempts.
  2. A hotfix for SPLAT/GAiA systems that, along other things, optimizes how the SYN+ACK packets that come back from the server are processed (IPSO does not require this).
  3. Where applicable, use multiqueue to increase the number of processors that can handle traffic on a given interface.
  4. Increasing the receive buffers on the interface.
These settings have proven to be effective at mitigating a potentially large SYN flood. That said, there's only so much you can do. Your Internet link is still a potential bottleneck. Your Security Gateways, even optimally configured, can only process so much traffic.
Unfortunately, there is no silver-bullet solution to this problem other than bigger and better servers--or security gateways. This means that denial of service is something we're going to have to battle with for a long time.

Recently, I was approached by a few people inside Check Point about doing a security-focused blog. I could have easily done this on phoneboy.com, though despite its history as being the definitive place to go for information related to Check Point FireWall-1 back in ye olden days, I decided to leave the current site as-is.

My goal here on phoneboy.net is to share my own insights about things going on in the computer and network security space. I've done that in the past on phoneboy.com, but my goal is to do it here with a singular focus. I will also leverage some of the brightest minds at Check Point to explain things that, quite frankly, I don't understand, and share that insight with you.

Just to be clear: I work for Check Point, and I will surely share Check Point-related things here, but this blog will be my own thoughts.