FromĀ Why Firesheepā€™s Time Has Come | SteveĀ (GRC) Gibson's Blog:

In case youā€™ve been somewhere off the grid, and have somehow missed the news, Firesheep is an incredibly easy to use add-on for the Firefox web browser that, when invoked while connected to any open and unencrypted WiFi hotspot, lists every active web session being conducted by anyone sharing the hotspot, and allows a snooping user to hijack any other userā€™s online web session logon with a simple double-click of the mouse. The snooper, then logged on and impersonating the victim, can do anything the original logged on user/victim might do.

I've experimented with Firesheep on my own system. Normally, I use Google Chrome, but I installed a fresh copy of Firefox just for the occasion to try Firesheep.

Within a few moments, I was able to pick up web sessions happening from my Google Chrome browser. I was able to use both my Facebook and Twitter from Firefox without having to log into them! It did pick up my Google login, but before I hit Gmail, I had to provide authentication. Remember, this was a fresh installation of Firefox on a machine that did not previously have Firefox installed at all!

This is scary stuff. As Steve Gibson says, though, this has always been possible with unencrypted WiFi by anyone with enough 1337 5killz to pull it off. Now, it's as simple as installing a web browser plugin.

FromĀ an article on Cnet announcing a mobile security product:

The [product] runs on all mobile operating systems and devices. It includes antivirus, personal firewall, antispam, and remote monitoring and control services. It remotely backs up and restores data and can locate devices that are lost and stolen, as well as wipe data from stolen devices. It also can send an alert when a SIM card has been removed or replaced. For enterprise users, it protects devices accessing networks with SSL-based virtual private network.

And it makes great toast, too!

Reality check. The functionality of the above mentioned product is highly dependent on the mobile platform we're talking about. A quick trip to the vendor's website shows you what options are available on which platform, and it's clearly not the same.

Mobile operating systems are designed more secure from the get-go. That doesn't completely reduce the need for security, but it does reduce or eliminate certain classes of threats. Also, each mobile OS has their own unique restrictions on the kinds of apps that can be written. Each mobile OS has different security services that can be utilized in different ways.

In short, what you can do on iPhone and what you can do on Android are very different. Even if a vendor provides the same application on multiple platforms, it is not going to provide the same level of functionality. It simply cannot.

The author of the above-linked piece did not even attempt to articulate this critical point. If you're looking at a mobile security solution for your enterprise, you simply have to be aware of this reality so as you don't expect something that cannot be delivered.

Disclaimer: My employer offers a competing product:Ā Mobile Access Software Blade. However, the above thoughts are my own.

FromĀ Check Point isn't for sale, says Shwed - Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News:

Two months ago, antivirus systems giant McAfee was sold to Intel for $7.7 billion. At the time, a number of analysts suggested that Check Point Software Technologies would also be an attractive target for takeover. Gil Shwed, the company's founder and leader, yesterday shrugged at the idea in conversation with reporters, after the company filed its third-quarter financials.

Anything's possible, Shwed said: but he's been very consistent in his position for the last 17 years, which is that Check Point isn't for sale. "We are very proud of the fact that we are an Israeli company, an independent one," he said.

Why would Check Point put themselves up for sale when the financials continue to be strong and only getting better? I think it's just "wishful thinking" by the analysis.

Disclaimer: I work for Check Point.

FromĀ Schneier on Security: Stuxnet:

Computer security experts are often surprised at which stories get picked up by the mainstream media. Sometimes it makes no sense. Why this particular data breach, vulnerability, or worm and not others? Sometimes its obvious. In the case of Stuxnet, theres a great story.

As the story goes, the Stuxnet worm was designed and released by a government--the U.S. and Israel are the most common suspects--specifically to attack the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran. How could anyone not report that? It combines computer attacks, nuclear power, spy agencies and a country thats a pariah to much of the world. The only problem with the story is that its almost entirely speculation.

What strikes me about the Stuxnet story is that it's really "nothing new." Yes there were some new zero-day vulnerabilities found. However, a virus that propagates by rogue USB keys? Didn't we learn anything from the 1980s when viruses propagated by floppy disks?

While I am sympathetic to people who would like some of the functionality that jailbreaking your iPhone provides--heck, I wouldn't mind some of it myself--anyone who is calling upon Apple to "call off the dogs" on jailbreakers clearly doesn't understand what they are asking Apple to do.

Jailbreaking is a process by which you can run programs on the iPhone that did not come from the App Store--apps that are not Steve Jobs approved, so to speak. Seems fairly straightforward, right? I mean, who is Apple to tell me what I can run on my phone, right?

The problem is: every single one of these jailbreaks is performed by exploiting a security vulnerability in the phone's software. Every single one. The most recent example of this was the Jailbreak Me website that, by simply visiting a web page and sliding a slider, would trigger an exploit in your phone that would cause it to execute the necessary code to jailbreak the device.

Of course, if the jailbreakers can cause your phone to execute arbitrary code, so can a bad guy. And that's the point behind Apple "stopping" the jailbreakers. It's not really to stop them, it's to stop the bad guys who can use the same vulnerabilities to do worse things.

Instead of being critical to Apple for stopping jailbreakers, how about we be critical to Apple for not allowing us to run software of our choosing on our own device, even if Apple doesn't approve of it? That's the real problem, and that's what we should be focusing on.